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JUSTICE SCALIA AND THE ELUSIVE IDEA OF
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INTERSTATE COMMERCE
RICHARD B. COLLINS*
[Tihe Court for over a century has engaged in an enterprise that it
has been unable to justify by textual support or even coherent non-
textual theory, that it was almost certainly not intended to undertake,
and that it has not undertaken very well. It is astonishing that we
should be expanding our beachhead in this impoverished territory,
rather than being satisfied with what we have already acquired by a
sort of intellectual adverse possession.
Scalia, J., in Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Department
of Revenue.'
Justice Scalia's views are bracing. No one would accuse him of excessive
caution in his approach to Court precedents with which he differs. 2 Nor
does he lightly concur in opinions of his colleagues; since joining the
Court, he has issued more solo opinions than even Justice Stevens.'
This article examines the views of Justice Scalia and the Rehnquist
Court on what Chief Justice Marshall tagged as Congress's "power to
regulate commerce in its dormant state, ' 4 under which the Court defends
the American common market. Justice Scalia has advocated cutting back
this doctrine so that it would forbid only discrimination against interstate
commerce. At the same time, other members of the Court have employed
a broadened definition of forbidden discrimination. Justice Scalia has
countered by arguing that discrimination should be facial to be fatal.
I shall argue here that the Court's loosened definition of discrimination
is unfortunate and ought to be resisted, as several members of the Court
have done. But trying to accomplish this by confining discrimination to
"facial" won't work; Justice Scalia's own opinions give this away. A
more promising path is to recognize the difference between state laws
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado. I am grateful for the advice and
comments of Gene Nichol and for the research assistance of Rick Stone.
1. 483 U.S. 232, 265 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3064, 3065, 3067 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring) ("Justice O'Connor's assertion ... cannot be taken seriously"; "the most stingy
possible holding"; "the least responsible" course of action); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, -, 109 S. Ct. 647,, 683 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("the creation of a new branch
altogether, a sort of junior-varsity Congress .. .will be disastrous"); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654, 712 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Court's judgment "ad hoc, standardless"); Johnson v.
Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 677 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(Title VII has "been converted into a powerful engine of racism and sexism").
3. My count through the 1988 Term is Justice Scalia - 52, Justice Stevens - 35. The quoted
language from Tyler Pipe is from a solo opinion. Justice Scalia concurred and dissented based on
precedent in the first part of his opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist. 483 U.S. at 254. The
quoted language is from the second part, in which no other justice joined.
4. Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829).
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that discriminate against interstate commerce without regard to the laws
of any other state and those that burden commerce only when other
states' laws are taken into account. To clarify the distinction, I shall
label these concepts respectively independent and dependent discrimina-
tion.
The independent discrimination concept identifies protectionist state
laws that are presumptively invalid. Discrimination so defined is thus a
practical concept producing a. workable rule capable of predictable ap-
plication by state officials and lower courts. In contrast, dependent
discrimination does not identify presumptively invalid state laws. The
validity of burdens on interstate commerce arising only when the laws
of two or more states are considered turns on factors other than dis-
crimination. The principal factors involved are effects on commerce in
transit through the state and the state's justification. Thus, when the
Court labels such state laws "discriminatory," it achieves almost nothing
analytically, but rather, causes confusion. Clarity of analysis is improved
by confining the concept of discrimination against interstate commerce
to independent discrimination and categorizing other cases according to
the actual criteria upon which the Court bases its decisions.
If the Court's definition of discrimination were limited to independent
discrimination, Justice Scalia's view could be reformulated. Should the
Court entirely confine the dormant commerce power doctrine to inde-
pendent discrimination, for the reasons that Justice Scalia asserts in favor
of his facial discrimination standard? That is, should the Court sustain
all state laws that do not discriminate independently of the laws of other
states? If this were done, the Court would abandon its efforts to police
multiple taxation of interstate commerce and its efforts to protect com-
merce in transit through a state.
Neither history nor policy justifies abandoning judicial protection of
commerce in transit. This was the problem most clearly within the intent
of the framers, so that Justice Scalia's concern about original intent
ought to accord it priority rather than abandon it. On the other hand,
the Court's present policing of multiple taxation includes both commerce
in transit and state import-export commerce. When multiple taxation
solely involves a state's import-export commerce, common market con-
cerns are not so strongly implicated. The Court could sustain such laws
without serious damage to our national market.
I. JUSTICE SCALIA'S THEORY REVEALED
Justice Scalia has unfolded his commerce clause theory in stages, like
a serialized story. Chapter one was his 1987 concurring opinion in CTS
v. Dynamics Corp. of America.' While voting with the Court to overrule
5. 481 U.S. 69 (1987), reversing 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986). The preface to chapter one was
Professor Scalia's remark to a symposium on federalism that the dormant commerce power doctrine
is not "a good idea." Scalia, The Two Faces of Federalism, 6 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 19, 21
(1982).
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Judge Posner and sustain Indiana's anti-takeover statute, Justice Scalia
announced that he disagreed with the Codrt's traditional commerce clause
theory and endorsed a more limited doctrine that would confine invalidity
to discrimination against interstate commerce or "an impermissible risk
of inconsistent regulation by different States."
'6
His view further unfolded two months later when the Court announced
its decisions in Tyler Pipe and American Trucking Associations v. Schei-
ner.7 Both rulings invalidated state taxes by concluding that they ' dis-
criminated against interstate commerce. The peroration of Justice Scalia's
blistering dissent in Tyler is quoted at the head of this article. He argued
from original intent and policy against any dormant commerce power
doctrine. He also wrote a specific dissent in American Trucking that
invoked his Tyler opinion.'
For the next year, Justice Scalia sheathed his sword. He quietly con-
curred in Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for a unanimous Court
sustaining an application of Louisiana's use tax. 9 This was a routine case
of a kind that we'll see no more under the Court's reduced appellate
jurisdiction. 0 But the opinion was based on the Court's precedents to
which Scalia objects. Later in the same term, Justice Scalia wrote for
a unanimous Court to overturn Ohio's discriminatory tax on ethanol
imported from Indiana." His disagreements with the Court's precedents
were reserved in an innocuous footnote, and the opinion itself was on
his terms: Ohio's law "on its face . . . violate[s] the cardinal requirement
of nondiscrimination."' 2
6. 481 U.S. at 95 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). In fact, the
quoted words were the essence of the Court's traditional theory in context; Scalia's disagreement
was more with the Court's articulation than with its doctrine. In Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.
624 (1982), the Court struck down Illinois' anti-takeover statute based on risk of conflicting regulations
of different states. The CTS opinion distinguished MITE because the Indiana statute was confined
to Indiana-chartered corporations. The effect of both decisions is to allocate exclusive jurisdiction
to regulate corporate takeovers to the state of incorporation, thus preventing conflicting state
regulation.
Before CTS, Justice Scalia had joined the Court's unanimous rejection of an import-export
clause challenge to a state property tax. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham Co., 479 U.S.
130 (1986). While R. J. Reynolds involved some of the same concepts as the commerce clause
doctrines Scalia questions, the import-export clause is a more specific constitutional text with a
distinct history.
7. 483 U.S. 266 (1987).
8. Id. at 303. See also American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 58 U.S.L.W. 4704, 4713 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
9. D. H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24 (1988).
10. See Pub. L. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (1988), applying to cases that became subject to appeal
on or after September 25, 1988. Before this statute became effective, dormant commerce power
challenges that lost in state courts were within the Court's appellate jurisdiction, and cases challenging
state taxes were kept out of the lower federal courts by the statutes limiting federal district court
jurisdiction over state tax attacks. Hence, some entirely unremarkable affirmances such as D. H.
Holmes got full-dress opinions. Under the newly reduced appellate jurisdiction, these cases will be
denied review on certiorari. See generally Boskey & Gressman, The Supreme Court Bids Farewell
to Mandatory Appeals, 109 S. Ct. 412 (1988).
11. New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988).
12. New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 274. On broader theory, see id. at 273 n.2.
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Justice Scalia reentered the lists in Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco
Enterprises.3 The Court overturned an Ohio statute that denied statute
of limitations defenses to foreign corporations that had not consented
to the general jurisdiction of Ohio's courts. The Court refused to base
its decision on discrimination against interstate commerce, and Justice
Scalia concurred in the judgment based on discrimination.
4
In Goldberg v. Sweet, 5 the Court sustained Illinois' tax on interstate
telephone calls charged to an Illinois service address. All justices voted
to sustain, but three concurred separately. 6 Justice Scalia squarely asserted
that only facial discrimination against interstate commerce ought to in-
validate a state law.' 7
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Director, Division of Taxation of
New Jersey'8 was another routine affirmance of a state tax. Justice
Blackmun's opinion relied on traditional criteria, and Justice Scalia con-
curred separately, based on his facial discrimination standard.' 9
Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc.20 overturned a Connecticut statute regu-
lating wholesale beer prices. The outcome seemed controlled by recent
precedents, although Justices Scalia and Kennedy were new votes. 2' Justice
13. 486 U.S. 888 (1988). The case began as a contract action in federal district court based on
diversity jurisdiction. The lower federal courts struck down the state law at issue, so the case was
also within the Court's former appellate jurisdiction. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
14. Bendix Autolite, 486 U.S. at 890, 895 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Chief Justice
Rehnquist's dissent concluded, "I see no discrimination against interstate commerce here." Id. at
900.
15. 488 U.S. 252, 109 S. Ct. 582 (1989).
16. Id. at - , 109 S. Ct. at 585 (Justices Stevens, O'Connor and Scalia).
17. Id. at - , 109 S. Ct. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
18. 109 S. Ct. 1617 (1989). Amerada was a product of the jurisdictional rules since changed.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
19. Amerada Hess, 109 S. Ct. at 1625 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia
added his agreement with the Court's conclusion that the taxpayer had a sufficient connection to
the state to satisfy the due process clause. Id. The Court bases its standard for a taxpayer's
connection to a taxing jurisdiction on both the commerce and due process clauses. See Container
Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1983). Justice Scalia confined his
concurrence on this point to the due process clause.
In Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kansas, 489 U.S. 493 (1989), the
Court unanimously rejected a commerce clause challenge to a state regulation of natural gas pipelines.
Justice Scalia joined the Court's opinion that was based on traditional criteria, but the case was
chiefly about preemption rather than the dormant commerce power.
20. 109 S. Ct. 2491 (1989) (Healy I1).
21. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986);
United States Brewers Ass'n v. Healy, 692 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1982), aff'd mem., 464 U.S. 909
(1983) (Healy 1); both followed, 109 S. Ct. at 2499-2501. Because the Healy cases involved regulatory
laws rather than taxes, there was federal district court jurisdiction, invoked by the beer barons.
The lower federal courts struck down the state laws, so the cases were again within the Court's
former appellate jurisdiction. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
Part of the dispute in Healy, Brown-Forman, and other liquor cases was about the reach of
the twenty-first amendment, which expressly authorizes states to prohibit importation of intoxicants.
In.Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966), the Court had unanimously sustained
a less burdensome state regulation of liquor prices, relying on the twenty-first amendment, but its
opinion was strongly hedged. The Brown-Forman opinion distinguished Seagram, then Healy II
overruled it. 109 S. Ct. at 2502.
The appointments of Justices Scalia and Kennedy have not affected the Court's division on the
twenty-first amendment irue. In Brown-Forman, the Burger Court rejected twenty-first amendment
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Kennedy joined Justice Blackmun's majority opinion, and Justice Scalia
concurred based on his standard of facial discrimination against interstate
commerce." However, discrimination was not so evident to the three
dissenters .23
As this review suggests, how much a discrimination-only standard would
change the dormant commerce power doctrine depends very much on
one's definition of discrimination. Scholars have argued in favor of various
discrimination standards that would increase or reduce invalidation of
state laws.Y If the justices follow conceptually different definitions, the
discrimination standard could become so vague that it simply conceals
what the Court is doing.
II. THEME AND VARIATION ON DISCRIMINATION
A. Tariffs as Discrimination
When thinking about legal barriers to intersovereign trade, it is natural
to focus on tariffs as the most prominent device in the traditional arsenal
of governmental parochialism. Reasoning by induction, we can generalize
from tariffs and similar methods like embargoes and quotas to conclude
that discrimination against intersovereign trade is a categorical evil that
suppresses free trade. Applying the commerce clause to. interstate trade,
the Supreme Court reached this conclusion long ago, 25 and it has often
relied on discrimination as a standard to identify presumptively invalid
state laws.
To be useful, a general legal standard should be sufficiently defined
for reasonably consistent application. For discrimination against interstate
commerce, the question is what legal devices are so tariff-like that they
should fall under the same condemnation. However, the idea of dis-
immunity by a 6-3 vote. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell were in the majority. See also
Bacchus Imports v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (same). In Healy II, the Rehnquist Court rejected
the same argument by the same vote, with Justices Scalia and Kennedy in the majority.
22. 109 S. Ct. at 2503 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
23. 109 S. Ct. at 2504 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Stevens and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
24. See Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982); Farber,
State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 395 (1986); Hellerstein,
Constitutional Limitations on State Tax Exportation, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 1; Regan, Siamese
Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine;
(11) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MicH. L. Rav. 1865 (1987); Regan, The Supreme Court
and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MicH. L. REv. 1091
(1986); Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clause as a Restriction on State Regulation and Taxation:
An Analysis in Terms of Constitutional Structure, 31 WAYNE L. Rav. 885 (1985); Smith, State
Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce, 74 CAuIF. L. REv. 1203 (1986).
25. See Hinson v. Lott, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 148, 151-53 (1869) (dictum); Woodruff v. Parham,
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123, 138-140 (1869) (dictum). Both the Court and scholars regularly invoke the
tariff model. See, e.g., Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc. 294 U.S. 511, 521-22 (1935); Regan, supra
note 24, at 1095.
The Treaty of Rome governing the European Economic Communities achieves the same gen-
eralization by forbidding tariffs and "all charges having equivalent effect" and quotas "and all
measures having equivalent effect." Treaty of Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 9, 30, published in 1 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 11 201, 321.
Summer 19901
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
crimination has acquired great rhetorical force from its deployment in
civil rights battles, and interstate commerce cases are not immune from
this development. Lawyers attacking state commercial laws and justices
explaining invalidations are tempted to claim the high ground of dis-
crimination. This has intensified disagreements over how the concept
should be defined in commerce clause cases. In the Rehnquist Court,
the debate matches Justice Scalia, seeking to limit the dormant commerce
power doctrine to facial discrimination, against other justices who ex-
plicitly reject that view and apply a very broad definition.
B. Independent or Dependent Discrimination
Tariffs make transboundary trade more expensive than trade within
the enacting state. If we define discrimination by generalizing from this
effect alone, any state law causing such differential expense would be
condemned as equivalent to a tariff. But this would go much too far.
A firm operating in two states incurs many costs simply from the existence
of separate legal systems. Two bureaucracies must be paid instead of
one, the firm must hire separately licensed persons to do certain things,
and it must obey disparate rules that add costs, such as safety and
labeling standards for goods. Many of these costs inhere in a federal
system and can't be eliminated without abolishing it.
How can we generalize from tariffs in a more limited way, consistent
with both a federal system and a common market? Another feature of
tariffs is that they make transboundary commerce more expensive re-
gardless of what any other government does. A tariff disadvantages
interstate commerce whether or not any other state imposes one. In
contrast, many other laws disadvantage interstate commerce only if we
take into account the laws of two or more states. An annual property
tax applied to an interstate railroad car disadvantages interstate commerce
only if imposed by more states than one. A state law requiring railroad
cars to have a particular kind of safety coupler disadvantages interstate
commerce only when another state in which the car travels requires a
different, incompatible coupler.
From the point of view of an interstate firm or a national economist,
either kind of discrimination can be very costly, and there is no general
reason to condemn one more than the other. But from the perspective
of the federal system, the two are very different. Except for a few special
circumstances such as quarantines, independently discriminatory laws serve
only to protect local interests from their direct competitors in other
states-the policy known as protectionism.2 6 Indeed, that is usually why
26. This definition must be altered when applied to state laws that discriminate against commerce
in transit through a state and in favor of import-export commerce of that state. Such laws are
independently discriminatory, and to some extent they benefit locals over their outside competitors,
but that is not the principal effect or usual purpose. Such laws are rare in the United States, and
the discussion in the text assumes the usual definition, discrimination between interstate and intrastate
commerce. However, commerce in transit is very important to commerce clause jurisprudence. See
infra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
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the enacting state adopts them.27 Protectionism is not essential or even
important to state autonomy; a federal system can flourish without it.
State laws that have discriminatory effects on interstate commerce only
in conjunction with the laws of other states often carry out essential
functions of state government. Compare a tariff on milk imports with
a tax on milk sales. The tariff raises some revenue, but the only effect
of its tariff form is to protect local milk producers. The tax on milk
sales has no distinct effect on interstate commerce unless another state
can and does tax some of the same sales. In that event, local commerce
is favored in the same way as under tariffs; the law is protectionist to
that extent. But the sales tax is primarily a revenue measure, and modern
government is heavily reliant on either this tax or others presenting the
same issue.
The same contrast can be seen for regulatory laws. A quota on milk
imports protects local milk producers. Regulating the way milk should
be transported is not a uniquely interstate burden unless another state
imposes different, conflicting regulations. In that event, interstate com-
merce is specially burdened according to the degree of conflict. State
government again has important interests in promoting health, safety,
the environment, and other worthy ends.
In sum, prohibiting independent discrimination against interstate com-
merce (except for quarantines and the like) bars only protectionism. But
limiting dependent discrimination directly invades essential state interests.
C. The Court's Discrimination Concept(s)
In reviewing state regulatory laws, the Supreme Court has consistently
conceived of discrimination against interstate commerce as what I have
called independent discrimination. When burdens on commerce arise from
conflicting or cumulative regulations of two or more states, the Court
labels the state laws at issue as "nondiscriminatory." 28 It may nevertheless
strike them down as "undue burdens," but not on the basis of discrim-
ination. 29
27. Protectionist purpose is usually present at enactment. In the unusual case where it is not,
continued enforcement is intentional, in the relevant sense, after discrimination becomes apparent.
See, e.g., Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64 (1970) (striking down accidental
discrimination).
28. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 529 (1959). This ru!e works both ways:
a state cannot justify independent discrimination by reference to the laws of other states. See
Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982); Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366
(1976). Cf. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1975) (analogous ruling under interstate
privileges and immunities clause).
29. Bibb, 359 U.S. at 529 (striking down Illinois' requirement of peculiar mudflaps for trucks).
See also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 427 U.S. 624 (1982).
The Court has struck down a few state laws as "undue burdens" on interstate transportation
or communication even though they do not impose any extra burden (actual or potential) on interstate
activities of the subject of regulation. E.g., Cleveland, C., C. & S. Ry. v. Illinois, 177 U.S. 514
(1900) (voiding state law requiring all passenger trains to stop for passengers at all county seats).
The famous decision in Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), might be so characterized.
In those instances, a state "discriminated" by selecting as the subject of regulation a mode of
transportation or communication in which commerce in transit heavily predominated. See infra notes
121-23 and accompanying text.
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This is a precise rule because independent discrimination is usually easy
to identify; indeed, it is often facial, as Justice Scalia would have it.10
When it is, the Court imposes "a virtually per se rule of invalidity."'"
The Court is much less exact in its review of state taxes. It has
sometimes defined discrimination to mean what I have described as
independent discrimination and has classified burdens on interstate com-
merce that arise solely from cumulative taxes of two states as nondis-
criminatory.12 But on other occasions, it has branded cumulative or
multiple taxation as discrimination." In the latter instances, it has relied
on what I have called dependent discrimination but without differentiating
it from independent discrimination. Recent disagreements within the Court
are part of the muddled pattern for tax cases.
Concluding that a tax is not independently discriminatory does not
automatically sustain it. The Court has struck down many multiple tax
burdens but has based invalidity on more flexible criteria than discrim-
ination.3"
Justice Scalia argues for a limit to facial discrimination, but his opinions
suggest a concern about independent discrimination. While arguing for
a facial limit, he has favorably cited decisions that struck down nonfacial
(but independent) discrimination." His dissents have been targeted at the
multiple taxation doctrine, which involves only dependent discrimination.36
30. But not always; some nonfacial statutes are independently discriminatory. Certain state-
imposed devices inherently burden outsiders in relation to their local competitors, so that the
economic effect is the same as facial discrimination. The best known are those employed in the
"drummer" cases, in which state or local governments imposed special requirements on sales agents.
See, e.g., Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
When state laws draw lines based on product differences or selling methods that happen to
favor local interests, the Court sustains them whenever the state advances any plausible, nonpro-
tectionist basis for the distinction. See, e.g., Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951)
(sustaining "Green River ordinance" forbidding door-to-door selling because it furthered residential
privacy, safety, and quiet, despite resulting advantages to local retailers). But in a few instances,
regulations based on product differences appear to have no other purpose than to erect tariff-like
barriers, and the Court strikes them down. E.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (striking down North Carolina labeling law burdening apples imported
from certain states). The same rule applies to tax cases. E.g., Bacchus Imports, Inc. v. Dias, 468
U.S. 263 (1984) (striking down liquor tax because of exemptions for products made locally); Dayton
Power & Light Co. v. Lindley, 58 Ohio St. 2d 465, 391 N.E.2d 716 (1979) (striking down tax on
low-sulfur coal burdening imports).
31. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
32. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978), sustaining a state tax over
Justice Powell's dissent, which expressly argued that unfair apportionment that resulted in multiple
taxation should constitute forbidden discrimination. Compare id. at 278-80 with id. at 283, 288-97
(Powell, J., dissenting). See also Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of R.R. Comm'rs, 332
U.S. 495, 501-03 (1947), discussed infra at notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 439 (1939) (invalidating as
discriminatory state gross income tax that did not discriminate unless risk of cumulative burdens
imposed by other states was considered). See also infra notes 54-68 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-76 (1988) (citing
Bacchus, 468 U.S. 263, and Hunt, 432 U.S. 333); supra note 30.
36. In his Tyler dissent, Justice Scalia explicitly recognized that multiple taxation can be called
"discrimination" only by considering cumulative effects of the laws of two or more states. 483
U.S. 232, 258 (1987). See id. at 254 n.l (tax can be called "facially discriminatory" only by
examining taxes of other states).
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Moreover, there is a circularity problem. If discrimination is defined to
include dependent discrimination, then multiple taxation is facially dis-
criminatory, as some justices have argued."
One of Justice Scalia's purposes is to achieve standards that reduce
case-by-case judicial discretion.38 Superficially, that purpose would be
better served by a facial standard, but it would be too easy for state
drafters to avoid.39 Moreover, confining the discrimination principle to
independent discrimination would focus the doctrine in a predictable way,
so judicial discretion can be confined.
The Court's disagreements and uncertainties about discrimination en-
courage litigants to keep pressing the concept. Their cause is aided by
multifarious uses of the word discrimination outside of commerce clause
jurisprudence. Four recent cases, two about taxes and two involving
regulatory laws, reflect the Court's uncertainty about discrimination against
interstate commerce.
III. COMMERCE DISCRIMINATION IN THE
REHNQUIST COURT
A. The Tyler Hype
Justice Scalia delivered his vehement challenge to commerce clause
doctrine in Tyler Pipe. In addition to the language quoted at the head
of this article, his opinion accused the Court of implicitly overruling "a
rather lengthy list of prior decisions. '"' From this, one would think that
the case involved a sharp departure from precedent. Yet the holding in
the case was conservative with respect to precedent, which was followed
as closely as possible.
42
The Court based its Tyler decision on discrimination against interstate
commerce although, with Justice Scalia, I would classify it as a case
about nondiscriminatory multiple burdens on interstate commerce. Or,
according to the terms adopted in this article, the case was about dependent
discrimination. If that was what the Court meant, my disagreement is
with its undifferentiated definition of discrimination.
37. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 290 (1987), discussed infra at
notes 69-84 and accompanying text. Scholars who argue for a standard of intentional discrimination
or intentional protectionism face a similar problem. While dependent discrimination need not be
intended, it often is, particularly in the tax field, and in any case, it is intentional to continue
enforcement after discriminatory/protectionist effects are revealed.
38. See, e.g., Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 895 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
39. See supra note 30.
40. 483 U.S. at 255.
41. The Court did expressly overrule General Motors v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964), "to
the extent . . . inconsistent" and approve the theory of one of the dissents in that case. 483 U.S.
at 248. But that was a narrow and technical overruling. See infra notes 54-68 and accompanying
text. The Court also unanimously rejected a broader attack on Washington's business taxes. 483
U.S. at 248-51.
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Washington imposed a gross income tax on all business activities "in
the State." 4 2 Two of the specified classes of business activities were
manufacturing and wholesaling, both assessed at the same rate on the
same tax base, the price of goods sold. Local manufacturers who sold
at wholesale within the state and paid tax on sales received a full credit
against the tax on manufacturing. Thus, the tax on manufacturing con-
sidered alone facially discriminated against interstate commerce because
the tax was imposed on exported goods but not on goods sold locally.
But if manufacturing and wholesaling were considered together, any
business operating in the state paid the same tax, and interstate commerce
was burdened only to the extent that another state taxed the same
transactions. From that perspective, the case was about nondiscriminatory
multiple burdens. Because the scheme was one tax applied to several
kinds of business activities, it was more realistic to view the case this
way. No discrimination arose based on Washington's taxes alone; one
had to take into account the actual or hypothetical taxes of other states
to find multiple taxes.
To see where this problem fit into preexisting law, we need to look
briefly at the general law on nondiscriminatory multiple taxation of
interstate commerce. The Court has attempted to limit all multiple tax-
ation, but in a general and flexible manner. It has applied two limiting
concepts. One is exclusive allocation: when the basis for a state tax is
associated with but one state, such as taxes on realty, the Court allocates
exclusive taxing jurisdiction to that state. The Court upholds taxes by
the state and strikes taxation of the same event by other states, thus
reducing multiple taxation.4"
The alternative concept is apportionment. When more than one state
has jurisdiction over an interstate activity, the Court requires these states
to share taxing jurisdiction. A state can satisfy this requirement by granting
a credit against taxes paid to other states." Or the state can limit its
42. For the facts of the case, see 483 U.S. at 234-40.
43. See Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 617 (1981) (sustaining state coal
severance tax because "the severance can occur in no other state . . . no other state can tax the
severance"); Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 271-72, 278 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
The text says "reducing" multiple taxation to recognize that this method is inexact. Taxable
events do not neatly separate into economically distinct categories; some multiple taxation occurs
because states' definitions of taxable events overlap. The facts of Tyler illustrate the problem;
manufacturing and wholesaling are distinct events in many contexts but not when a manufacturer
sells new goods.
The Court's opinions do not describe the concept as allocation of jurisdiction, in commerce
clause cases nor in related due process cases about "minimum contacts." See Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958). The term is used by the leading treatise on state taxation of interstate
commerce. I J. HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION 328-30, 328 n.95 (1983).
44. See Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, -, 109 S. Ct. 582, 590 (1989) (combination of
fractional and credit apportionment); D. H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 31 (1988)
(credit provision is method of apportionment). Cf. International Harvester Co. v. Department of
Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 360-61 (1944) (Rutledge, J., concurring and dissenting) (credits are remedy
distinct from apportionment). The credit method can cause interstate conflicts about which state's
tax is primary and thus need not grant a credit. Id. The credit remedy is most commonly associated
with sales taxes. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
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taxes to a fraction of the tax that it applies to the same kind of activity
entirely within it, a fraction based on the proportion of the taxed event
occurring within the state. Annual property taxes on instrumentalities of
interstate transportation are often apportioned according to miles traveled
in each state. Net income taxes on interstate firms are apportioned based
on measures of the firm's business activity in the state. If apportionment
is reasonably accurate, multiple taxation is minimized. "5
Taxes on interstate sales straddle these concepts. Some sales, such as
ordinary retail transactions, are sufficiently local to one state to confine
formal taxing jurisdiction to it.4 Many other sales are taxable in both
the seller's and the buyer's jurisdictions. For practical reasons, states
have traditionally taxed interstate sales based on some concept of place
of sale.47 This amounts to a form of apportionment that resembles
exclusive allocation." The Court has sustained the practice, rather than
requiring apportionment of taxes on every sale between the seller's and
45. See Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 271-72, 278 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring); Hellerstein,
Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 2 COURTS AND FREE MARKETS 451,
451-53 (1982). Like allocation, this method is inexact because each state can choose its own definition
of taxable events and its own apportionment formulae. States are likely to select events and formulae
favorable to them, and this causes some multiple taxation. See Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252,
-, 109 S. Ct. 582, 588-91 (1989); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 278-80 (1978).
The Moorman Court concluded that more exact suppression of multiple taxation would too greatly
invade state autonomy.
46. Cf. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967) (striking
down attempt by buyers' state to collect use tax on sales from mail order/common carrier seller
in another state). The text says "formal taxing jurisdiction" because the Court sustains use taxes
imposed on buyers who bring goods into a state for use there. But the use taxes that have been
sustained credit sales taxes paid to another state, so that multiple taxation is not involved. See
Hellerstein, Complementary Taxes as a Defense to Unconstitutional State Tax Discrimination. 39
TAx LAW. 405 (1986).
47. See Nowak & Rotunda, Sales and Use Tax Credits, Discrimination Against Interstate Com-
merce, and the Useless Multiple Tax Concept, 20 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 273, 277 (1987). For a recent
variation, see Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1989), where the Court sustained Illinois' tax on
interstate telephone calls billed to an Illinois service address. The billing provision was a method
of apportionment akin to place of sale.
Departing from place of sale would require a state to distinguish local sales subject to its
exclusive jurisdiction from interstate sales subject to the jurisdiction of two or more states. This
would be complex and difficult, and no state attempts it on any general basis. However, parties
can arrange the place of sale by agreement and have an incentive to do so for big ticket items.
Thus some legal warfare arises from state efforts to counter place of sale arrangements that are
contrary to a state's interest.
48. See Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560, 564 (1975) (gross
receipts tax on local sales "apportioned exactly to the activities taxed, all of which are intrastate.")
This is not exclusive allocation because for many wholesale transactions, both states have jurisdiction
to tax, and in theory a state could choose a different apportionment formula than place of sale.
Sales and other turnover taxes are a particular concern in common market theory. The conflict
arising from taxing systems that emphasize taxation of production ("origin principle") and systems
that emphasize taxation of consumption ("destination principle") is considered a significant barrier
to transboundary trade. See generally FISCAL HARMONIZATION IN COMMON MARKETS (C. Shoup ed.
1967). The European Common Market has eliminated most of this barrier by adoption of its
harmonized system of value-added taxes. See A. EASSON, TAX LAW AND POLICY IN THE EEC 70-
150 (1980). However, that was plainly a policy decision beyond the competence of courts. The U.S.
Supreme Court allows each state to have whatever system of turnover taxes it chooses subject to
the apportionment requirement.
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buyer's states. This rule applies as well to gross income taxes when
measured by gross sales. 9
Considered separately, Washington's tax on manufacturing was a "lo-
cal" tax, imposed on an activity occurring entirely within the state and
thus taxable only there. Its wholesaling tax was a typical sales tax, which,
applied to interstate sales, was apportioned by the place of sale (to sales
"in the State"). The credit tied the two together for the class of man-
ufacturer-wholesalers. This class was not local because it included out-
of-state manufacturers who sold at wholesale in Washington. The tax
was obviously malapportioned. Conceptually, half the interstate activities
were in Washington, but the tax was imposed on all of the same activities,
external sales by local manufacturers and local sales by outside manu-
facturers.
The Court could have sustained the scheme, as Justice Scalia wished;
the fundamental common market concern with commerce in transit 0 was
not present, and merchants' ability to arrange the place of sale reduced
the practical burden on interstate commerce. But the Court's prior de-
cisions were strongly against that course. 5
On the other side, some scholars have argued that the Court ought
to require states to apportion interstate sales taxes like net income taxes,
based on the taxpayer's overall business activities in the state; that is,
to require that every transaction be apportioned between buyers' and
sellers' states.52 Instead, the Tyler Court gave the state the most flexibility
and changed its own precedents as little as possible. It held that a state
can cure the problem by granting credits against its tax to interstate
taxpayers who have paid a tax on the same transaction to another state."
This allowed Washington to continue its taxing system, and even to collect
the same tax whenever a taxpayer could not qualify for the credit, a
much less intrusive remedy than requiring apportionment of each trans-
action.
I have described what the Tyler Court did, but I have not described
the Court's rationale. In its prior decision in Armco Inc. v. Hardesty,
49. See, e.g., Standard Pressed Steel, 419 U.S. 560. Another boundary between apportionment
and allocation is the Court's concept of a unitary, multistate activity. Interstate firms have activities
so distinct (such as the income of a subsidiary firm in a different business) that the Court treats
them as separate for taxation purposes. If such activities occur in only one state, exclusive taxing
jurisdiction is allocated to that state. The issue arises when a state tries to include in its apportionment
base activities outside that state that the firm claims are separate. See F. W. Woolworth Co. v.
Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 354 (1982); Asarco, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458
U.S. 307 (1982). For a space-age example, see Communications Satellite Corp. v. Franchise Tax
Bd., 156 Cal. App. 3d 726, 203 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1984), appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 1201 (1985).
50. See infra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
51. See Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984), discussed infra notes 54-68 and accom-
panying text; I J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 43, at 111-26.
52. See Hellerstein, Is "Internal Consistency" Foolish?: Reflections on an Emerging Commerce
Clause Restraint on State Taxation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 138, 171-88 (1988) (authorities cited at 175
n.206). Justice Brennan advocated this view in General Motors v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 451
(1964) (Brennan, J., dissenting). But no other justice joined him, and he has not pursued the point.
53. 483 U.S. at 246, 249. The state could also choose apportionment of every transaction, but
this is unlikely. See supra note 47.
(Vol. 20
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INTERSTATE COMMERCE
the Court classified a similar tax as unlawful discrimination against
interstate commerce. 4 West Virginia had arranged its scheme the opposite
way, crediting manufacturing tax payments by local manufacturers against
its wholesaling tax. Thus, the wholesaling tax considered alone facially
discriminated against interstate commerce because it was paid by outside
manufacturers who sold in West Virginia, but it was not paid by their
local competitors. The state argued that the two taxes should be considered
together, but the Court disagreed.
The state also argued that the taxpayer should be required to prove
that it had actually paid higher combined taxes than its local competitors,
and Justice Rehnquist's dissent agreed." In retrospect, Justice Rehnquist's
position was not so different from the Court's because the credit remedy
approved in Tyler amounted to almost the same thing. The Court required
the state to cure its tax code on its face, while Justice Rehnquist's Armco
dissent would have imposed the same cure as applied .
6
The Armco Court decided that risk of, not actual, multiple taxation
was sufficient and overturned the tax. In doing so, it relied on Container
Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 7 which had upheld an ap-
portioned state tax on corporate net income applied to a multinational
corporation. The principal issue was whether the tax was invalid because
it involved foreign commerce." The company also attacked the state's
method of apportionment, and the Court dutifully reviewed the issue
and sustained the apportionment formula-a routine decision strongly
supported by precedent. In doing so, its opinion organized relevant
precedents into tests, one of which was tagged as a requirement of
"internal consistency." 9 This test asks whether, if all states impose the
same apportionment formula, there would be any multiple taxation of
the firm's income. The test is a logical way to examine a formula's facial
validity, although it determines an issue that is usually so easy that it
may be overly formalistic to define it as a "test." Indeed, no actual
state attempt at apportionment has failed this test. 60
54. 467 U.S. 638, 639 (1984). For the facts of Armco, see 467 U.S. at 634-41.
55. Id. at 644; id. at 646 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This appears to have been the view of
the issue taken in General Motors v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964), which was overruled pro
tanto by Tyler, although the General Motors opinion was vague. See supra note 41.
56. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. The Armco opinion did not suggest the credit
remedy; it did not address the remedy question.
Justice Scalia's Tyler dissent seems to be much more basic than Justice Rehnquist's Armco
dissent. Justice Scalia apparently would sustain the tax even if a taxpayer like Armco could prove
that it had paid a higher combined tax. 483 U.S. at 258-59. Because Chief Justice Rehnquist joined
in this view, he may have widened his disagreement with the majority.
57. 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
58. Id. at 184-97 (rejecting foreign commerce power argument by 5-3 vote). The special problem
in applying the apportionment requirement to multinational transactions or taxpayers is that the
United States has no power over foreign taxing authorities, so there is no way to require reciprocal
apportionment by other jurisdictions. Some domestic taxes have been struck down for this reason.
See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
59. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 169.
60. See Container Corp. 463 U.S. 159; Exxon v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207
(1980); Mobil Oil v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair,
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The Container Corp. opinion also discussed discrimination against
interstate commerce. "Aside from forbidding the obvious types of dis-
crimination against interstate or foreign commerce, [the anti-discrimi-
nation] principle might have been construed to require that a state
apportionment formula not ... produce double taxation." '6 But the
Court then pointed out that this definition of discrimination had been
rejected in a prior decision.
62
The Armco opinion relied on Container Corp. twice. First, it borrowed
the internal consistency test to decide if there were a risk of multiple
taxation. 6 This use of the test was even more formalistic than in Container
Corp.; once the Court reasoned that potential multiple taxation was
invalid, it was quite obvious (and uncontested by the state) that such
risk existed. There was no need of a formal test to answer the question,
and by adopting one, the opinion gave the impression that the test had
determined something important. Stated as an issue of apportionment of
the tax on manufacturer-wholesalers, the state had not attempted ap-
portionment, so malapportionment was obvious.
Second, the Armco Court said: "A tax that unfairly apportions income
from other States is a form of discrimination against interstate com-
merce. '" 64 In support, the opinion miscited the passage from Container
Corp. quoted above, which stated that unfair apportionment "might have
been construed" as forbidden discrimination but had not been. 65
Then came Tyler, so similar to Armco that the dominant question was
whether the two cases could be distinguished. The majority concluded,
correctly, that they could not be. 66 Justice Stevens' opinion fully quoted
the passages from the Armco opinion discussed above, applying the
internal consistency test and characterizing malapportionment as discrim-
ination. 67 As in Armco, the internal consistency test had nothing to do
with the contested issues, which had been determined before the opinion
addressed the definition of discrimination in the Armco quote.
The holdings in both Armco and Tyler were consistent with the weight
of precedent, and Justice Scalia's contrary accusation was mistaken. The
437 U.S. 267 (1978). States lose apportionment cases when they don't attempt to apportion, and
a court later decides that apportionment should be required, or when an apportionment formula
as applied produces grossly disproportionate results. See Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 168-69.
61. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 170.
62. Id. at 171 (citing Moorman Mfg. Co., 437 U.S. 267). See supra note 32. On the other
hand, some prior cases had defined discrimination this way, to include dependent discrimination.
See supra note 33.
63. 467 U.S. at 644.
64. Id.
65. Id. (citing Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 170-71). Justice Powell wrote for the Court in
Armco. Whether innocent or otherwise, his statement about discrimination revived the point he had
lost in Moorman. See supra note 32. But as previously mentioned, the Court had at other times
defined discrimination as it did in Armco. See supra note 33.
66. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987). In his
dissent, Justice Scalia tried to argue that Armco involved facial discrimination, but Tyler did not.
Id. at 256-59. This was plainly wrong (either both involved facial discrimination, or neither did,
depending on one's definition) and undermined his challenge to the majority's expansion of the
discrimination concept.
67. Id. at 247 (quoting Armco, 467 U.S. at 644).
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Court had a long-standing commitment to police multiple taxation, whether
or not defined as discrimination. On whether the standard ought to be
actual multiple taxation or the risk of it, there were decisions both ways.
But the dominant rule was that risk of multiple taxation was sufficient.
68
The deployment of the broad concept of dependent discrimination with
the internal consistency test was new, but it probably did not affect the
outcome of either case.
B. The American Trucking Detour
After ambiguous opinions in Armco and Tyler, the Court unmistakably
relied on the dependent discrimination concept in American Trucking.
The decision was issued in tandem with Tyler, and Justice Stevens wrote
for the Court in both.
The truckers attacked Pennsylvania's annual "flat" taxes on trucks
using state highways. The taxes were imposed in the same dollar amount
on every truck of a certain size, whether the truck used state highways
for one day per year or for 3651/.69 This form of taxation is plainly
nondiscriminatory if one considers only Pennsylvania's taxes. Extra bur-
dens on interstate commerce arise when other states impose like taxes,
so that interstate trucks pay two or more taxes, while local trucks pay
only one. According to the Court's dominant taxonomy, this was a
nondiscriminatory multiple burden case.
In the last century, the Court had concluded that multiple taxation of
interstate railroads and ships was invalid under the commerce clause.
70
After some uncertainty about remedy, the Court settled on apportionment
of taxing jurisdiction among states visited, each taxing at a percentage
of its rates on local transportation according to some measure such as
miles traveled in the state.
7'
As highway travel became commercially important, states argued that
the apportionment rule should not apply to highway taxes because the
states own, build, and maintain roads, and they should be able to tax
users to pay for them. The Court agreed and recognized an exception
68. See Hellerstein, supra note 52, at 165-70.
69. See American Trucking. 483 U.S. at 273-75.
70. See Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1873) (railroads); Hays v. Pacific
Mail S.S. Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 299 (1855) (ships). The Hays opinion did not rely on any specific
provision of the Constitution, but the decision has been interpreted to rest on the commerce clause.
See Morgan v. Parham, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 471 (1873).
Neither of these opinions, nor others of that period, described multiple taxation as "discrimi-
nation." Moreover, the dissent in the State Freight Tax case expressly argued that the tax was
good because there was no discrimination between intrastate and interstate commerce. 82 U.S. (15
Wall.) at 282.
71. The Court at first favored allocation of exclusive taxing jurisdiction to the home state, the
theory underlying Hays and State Freight Tax. See also State Tax on Gross Receipts, 82 U.S. (15
Wall.) 284 (1873), sustaining a state tax based on the allocation concept. Compare Justice Miller's
dissent, id. at 297, arguing for apportionment. Later, the Court changed to apportionment for
transportation cases, the modern rule. See I J. HELaEatSmn~i, supra note 43, at 128-36, 632-54. The
Court might sustain an unapportioned tax that granted a credit for taxes paid to other states. See
supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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to apportionment when a state can show that its tax reasonably relates
to highway use.72 Under this pay-for-use standard, the Court sustained
many unapportioned state highway taxes, including the most recent pre-
cedents on point in American Trucking.
7"
Justice Stevens' majority opinion invoked discrimination to lower the
precedential barrier. He applied the broader dependent discrimination
definition stated carelessly in Armco, taking in all multiple burdens.
Justice Stevens relied on the truckers' showing that trucks registered in
Pennsylvania averaged five times the in-state mileage of trucks registered
elsewhere. 7  Thus the average tax per mile paid by trucks registered in
other jurisdictions was five times greater. Dramatic as this statistic seemed,
discrimination nevertheless depended on other states' taxes. Assuming
similar usage, the statistic showed that trucks registered outside Penn-
sylvania and using its roads averaged five times more miles in other
states than did locally-registered trucks. If the other states did not tax,
all trucks paid the same tax.
Under the dependent discrimination standard, Pennsylvania's taxes were
facially discriminatory, although the characterization was contrary to the
dominant concept, as well as to the Court's specific precedents.', Justice
Stevens went on to apply the internal consistency test, relying on Armco.
Again the test did not determine a contested issue because Pennsylvania
had not attempted apportionment. But this time the opinion implied that
violation of the test was a substantial reason for invalidity.7 6
72. See Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 624 (1915). The Court relied on earlier decisions
sustaining charges for use of public wharves. See, e.g., Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107
U.S. 691 (1883). Cf. Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434 (1880) (wharfage charges that discriminated-
independently-against interstate commerce violated commerce clause).
73. See Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542 (1950); Aero Mayflower Transit Co.
v. Board of RR Comm'rs, 332 U.S. 495 (1947). Justice Scalia's opinion in Tyler claimed that the
internal consistency rule as applied in Tyler overruled these decisions. 483 U.S. at 254-55. Justice
O'Connor's dissent in American Trucking said the majority in that case had overruled the same
decisions. 483 U.S. at 298 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Court's American Trucking opinion
essentially agreed. See id. at 292-97. However, the "overruling" may have been only a change in
legal theory, not in the outcome of the case. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
74. American Trucking, 483 U.S. at 276, 282, 286. This statistic was not the optimum way to
show burden on interstate commerce; the truckers would have been better off focusing on the effect
on commerce in transit through the state. See infra notes 120-26 and accompanying text. But the
truckers' legal strategy relied heavily on the idea of personal discrimination against nonresidents of
the state, rather than discrimination against interstate commerce. This is a common source of
confusion in dormant commerce power cases. See Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional
Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 110-16 (1988).
75. American Trucking, 483 U.S. at 280-82. In Aero Mayflower, the Court had unanimously
decided that flat highway taxes do not discriminate against interstate commerce. 332 U.S. at 501-
03 (quoted in American Trucking, 483 U.S. at 293). The opinion was by Justice Rutledge, who
wrote more clearly about the commerce clause than most members of the Court. See International
Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 349 (1944) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
Justice Frankfurter dissented in Capitol Greyhound, but he did not rest his argument on discrimination.
339 U.S. at 548, 556-57 (Frankfurter, I., dissenting).
76. American Trucking, 483 U.S. at 282-86. Only Justices O'Connor and Powell saw Tyler and
American Trucking as different enough to justify different votes; both dissented in American Trucking,
and Justice O'Connor concurred in Tyler. See Tyler, 483 U.S. at 253 (O'Connor, J., concurring);
American Trucking, 483 U.S. at 298 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In the latter opinion, Justice
O'Connor acknowledged that the truckers' claim had force as an issue of first impression; she relied
principally on stare decisis.
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American Trucking's result was not necessarily wrong. The opinion
also concluded that "Pennsylvania's flat tixes do not even purport to
approximate fairly the cost or value of the use of Pennsylvania's roads,
'77
and this conclusion was supported by the truckers' statistical showing
that the average truck registered outside the state paid five times more
tax per mile. This would justify the decision according to traditional
criteria, including the policy of protecting commerce in transit, and
distinguish the precedents that the dissenters accused the Court of over-
ruling.78 But the Court stated this conclusion in rejecting the argument
that payment for use justified discrimination. The Court's invocation of
discrimination and its reliance on the misleading test of internal consistency
raise doubts about the scope of the decision. The near-admission that
leading precedents were overruled implies a major change.7 9 To no one's
surprise, the trucking industry has pressed its case in other states, so we
shall learn more about the subject in due course. 0
The broad definition of forbidden discrimination against interstate
commerce stated in the majority opinions in Armco, Tyler, and American
Trucking is unfortunate. The Court can't strike down all multiple and
conflict burdens (dependent discrimination) on interstate commerce. What
is feasible for many taxes is not feasible for regulations, which cannot
be apportioned. Even in the tax field, the pay-for-use idea and the
complex differences among state tax systems compel the Court to sustain
many multiple burdens. In selecting apportionment formulae, states can
choose variants most favorable to their own situations, which cause some
multiple taxation.8 A healthy federal system should allow broad variations
among state laws, including many duplicative regulations.
For these reasons, deciding when a multiple or conflict burden on
interstate commerce should be sustained or invalidated must depend on
more flexible factors than discrimination. To decide based on discrimi-
nation masks the issues and undermines the usefully precise independent
discrimination standard, which isolates protectionism. To the extent that
it was actually a basis for decision, the internal consistency test suffers
from the same defect. Rigorously applied, that test might greatly alter
commerce clause doctrine, invalidating many more state laws.1
2
77. 483 U.S. at 290.
78. See supra note 40. On commerce in transit, see infra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
Whether American Trucking fully overruled leading precedents or changed only the governing
theory is uncertain. According to the traditional test, an unapportioned state tax had to be justified
by its relation to highway use, and this caused some taxes to be sustained and others to be struck
down. For a complete catalog to that date, see Capitol Greyhound, 339 U.S. at 561 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting). Today's great preponderance of federal highway money could justify a shift in the
traditional balance.
79. See supra note 73.
80. See Hellerstein, supra note 52, at 153 n.86. As this article goes to press, the Court has just
announced its decisions in McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. 58
U.S.L.W. 4665 (1990), and American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 58 U.S.L.W. 4704 (1990). The
principal issue in both is whether there is a federal right to a tax refund when a state tax has
been held invalid under the commerce clause. See Collins, supra note 74, at 114 n.416.
81. See supra note 45.
82. See Hellerstein, supra note 52, at 148-63.
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The latest appearance of both the broader definition of discrimination
and the internal consistency test was in Goldberg v. Sweet. 3 Here, as
in the opinion of its birth, the Court used the internal consistency test
to review validity of an actual state attempt at apportionment, and the
tax readily passed the test. But Justice O'Connor had become so leery
of the internal consistency test and the American Trucking definition of
discrimination that she specially concurred to avoid joining an opinion
that relied on them.84 She is right; they have caused more obscurity than
enlightenment.
The vice is not the internal consistency test but the broad concept of
discrimination to which it is attached. The narrower definition, confined
to independent discrimination, precisely identifies state protectionism.
Multiple and conflict burdens do not coincide with protectionism and
traditionally have been invalidated more selectively, based on other criteria,
such as impact on commerce in transit. In tax cases, the key decision
is whether a particular tax ought to be subject to apportionment or
allocation. The dependent discrimination standard hides that decision
under a highly-charged idea. The same standard cannot be applied to
unapportionable regulations; to do so widens the already artificial gap
between the Court's tax and regulation opinions.
C. The Bendix Boiler
In 1974, Bendix hired Midwesco, an Illinois company, to deliver and
install a boiler system in Bendix's Ohio factory."5 Bendix sued for breach
of contract in 1980, and Midwesco pleaded Ohio's four-year statute of
limitations. Bendix invoked Ohio's rule tolling the statute for foreign
corporations that had not consented to the general jurisdiction of the
Ohio courts. The Supreme Court overturned the state rule under the
commerce clause.
The Court's decision adhered to precedent. The Court has struck down
other state statutes that penalized foreign corporations for not registering
in the state by denying them the right to sue in state courts as plaintiffs,
or by tolling statutes of limitations defenses, as Ohio did in Bendix.86
83. 488 U.S. 232, -, 109 S. Ct. 582, 588-91 (1989). A footnote in the Court's subsequent
opinion in Amerada Hess alluded to the test without naming it. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v.
Director, Div. of Taxation. 109 S. Ct. 1617, 1622 n.8.
84. Goldberg, 488 U.S. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 593-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring). As noted
previously, Justice O'Connor concurred in Tyler but dissented in American Trucking. See supra
note 76.
85. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888 (1988). For the facts of the case,
see 486 U.S. at 889-91.
86. See Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman. 419 U.S. 20 (1974) (striking down statute barring suit
by unregistered foreign corporation); Dahncke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921)
(same); Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197 (1914) (same). Cf. G. D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn,
455 U.S. 404 (1982) (state law similar to the one in Bendix did not deny equal protection; commerce
clause challenge remanded). Two lower courts have reached the same result as Bendix. See McKinley
v. Combustion Eng'g, 575 F. Supp. 942 (D. Idaho 1983); Coons v. American Honda Motor Co.,
94 N.J. 307, 463 A.2d 921 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1123 (1985) (same state statute as in
G.D. Searle, 455 U.S. 404).
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Because the only parties disadvantaged by such laws are foreign cor-
porations, it is tempting to see this as a problem of discrimination against
nonresidents, as Justice Scalia did.
87
But the Court, in its precedents, had not analyzed the problem that
way, and Justice Kennedy's opinion in Bendix expressly declined Justice
Scalia's strong urging to do so. 8 State discrimination against nonresidents
is not generally proscribed by the commerce clause. The usual discrim-
ination concept applies to interstate commerce, not out-of-state residency,
and the goal is a national common market, not a personal right of
nondiscrimination for nonresident merchants. 9 Moreover, rules requiring
foreign corporations to register largely match requirements that the state
imposes on its own corporations, so it is not obvious why the rules
should be condemned as discriminatory.
The problem is better viewed as one of cumulative or multiple burdens,
rather than discrimination, or in our adopted terminology, dependent
rather than independent discrimination. If only one state requires reg-
istration and consent to be sued, all corporations are treated alike. 9° But
when more states than one require it, interstate commerce bears a higher
regulatory burden than does local commerce.
Unlike tax burdens, regulatory laws can't be ameliorated by appor-
tionment. The courts must either sustain or strike them whole. For foreign
corporations, the Court has evolved the rule that states can require
interstate firms to register and consent to general state jurisdiction only
when they do substantial and continuous local business.9' This requires
more than the minimum contacts that sustain local jurisdiction under the
due process clause; a foreign corporation that cannot be required to
register can nevertheless be held liable for a tort. Midwesco's local activity
of installing the boiler was ample basis for tort or contract liability-it
would also sustain local or apportioned tax liability-even though not
sufficient to require general registration. This is a practical accommodation
between the states' legitimate interest in controlling businesses having a
substantial local situs and the national common market interest in not
burdening businesses located outside that buy or sell goods in the state.
There is reason to believe that the Court's protection of foreign cor-
porations has aided the special success of Delaware's corporation laws.
87. See Bendix Autolite, 486 U.S. at 898 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
88. Id. at 891.
89. That this is so can be seen more readily by considering the foreign commerce clause. States
may not discriminate against foreign commerce, but to base that rule on personal rights of foreign
merchants is absurd.
90. One might dispute this by pointing out that local registration and consent to suit would
more greatly burden firms located at a great distance from the state, but the relevant question is
the extra burden beyond that of defending long-arm cases, and that is minor. See infra text
accompanying notes 91-92.
91. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-On Drugs, 366 U.S. 276 (1961) (sustaining, by 5-4 vote, registration
requirement applied to foreign corporation with local sales office in state); Union Brokerage Co.
v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202 (1944) (sustaining registration requirement applied to foreign corporation
with local customhouse broker). Cf. Silver v. Woolf, 694 F.2d 8. 11-12, 13-14 (2d Cir. 1982)
(sustaining requirement that interstate debt collection firm be licensed locally).
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Unfortunately, both the majority and concurring opinions in Bendix
were vague and uncertain about what was at stake. The majority dwelt
on the particular burden of requiring foreign corporations to consent to
the general jurisdiction of Ohio's courts, in terms of the possibility that
suit would be brought in Ohio on claims otherwise not cognizable there. 92
Justice Scalia effectively picked that rationale apart by pointing out that
the due process clause bars suits lacking minimum contacts with the
state. 93 Neither opinion addressed the issue in terms of the multiple burden
on interstate firms, of registering and consenting to jurisdiction in every
state where they sell or buy even one widget.
The particular burden imposed by Ohio was not very great, and the
state did have the legitimate interest of aiding its citizens in serving
process on foreign corporations. However, as the Court's opinion sug-
gested, Ohio could have solved the service problem with a statute confined
to that aim, and Ohio had no legitimate reason to subject Midwesco to
the general jurisdiction of its courts. 94 Although the burden was light,
the statute had no justification and was struck down, not because it
alone was so harmful to interstate commerce, but because such laws in
every state would be.
D. The Healy Maneuver
In Healy the Court overturned Connecticut's statute setting maximum
manufacturers' prices for beer. The state required each brewer to post
prices and affirm that the prices were no higher than those for the same
beers in any bordering state. 9 The Court struck the statute on two
alternative grounds. First, based on precedent, it held that the statute
improperly attempted to regulate transactions in other states.9 Second,
the statute discriminated against interstate commerce because it facially
burdened only interstate sellers.9 Justice Scalia concurred in the latter
ground. The discrimination theory was a departure from prior cases,
which had not characterized statutes of this kind as discriminatory. 9 The
majority may have done this to garner Justice Scalia's vote.
In terms of the statute's facial application to brewers, discrimination
was debatable. While the statute's pricing requirement was imposed only
on certain interstate firms, an intrastate brewer would be forced to meet
the required price or be undersold. Moreover, the required price would
be set in the first instance by interstate firms; local competitors would
be forced to go along after the fact. Local firms might benefit to the
92. 486 U.S. 894.
93. Id. at 895.
94. Id. at 894-95. See also G. D. Searle, 455 U.S. at 413-14 (suggesting that requirement of
agent for service without more would be valid).
95. Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2491, 2493 (1989) (Healy 11).
96. Id. at 2499-2501.
97. Id. at 2501-02.
98. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986);
Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
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extent that the statute caused their interstate competitors to withdraw
entirely from the Connecticut market. But the statute would as likely
harm as help local firms, which are smaller and less able to cope with
price ceilings. Thus it is hard to see how the statute favored local brewers,
despite its facial application only to interstate companies. If this amounts
to "facial discrimination," so also do many port regulations, and the
holding of Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens" was wrong.
Moreover, Connecticut could avoid this "facial discrimination" in a
way unrelated to economic realities. Suppose the state set maximum
wholesale prices for all in-state sales by directing its beer bureaucrats to
base prices on their surveys of prices in bordering states. The system
would be less precise and more expensive to operate, but its results would
be much like those of the actual regulation. Yet there would be no
"facial discrimination" of the sort mentioned by the Court. l'0
Nevertheless, Healy arguably was within the traditional concept of
independent discrimination. The local interests that Connecticut claimed
to want to favor were not brewers but retailers and consumers. To the
extent that the statute successfully lowered Connecticut prices, it would
force an interstate brewer to set a uniform price between lower market
prices elsewhere and higher prices in Connecticut. 01 Beer retailers and
consumers in states where market prices had been lower would pay higher
prices because of Connecticut's regulation. Connecticut consumers and
retailers would benefit at the expense of competing consumers and retailers
in other states.
Whether or not such discrimination in favor of local consumers and
retailers can be called facial, it was independent of the impositions of
any other state; this was not a case about multiple or conflict burdens.
As the Court pointed out, other states also fixed beer prices, making
the burden on interstate commerce much more serious.1° But Connecticut's
statute alone was protectionist. In the Court's leading decision in this
area, Justice Cardozo had likened a state price regulation to customs
99. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) (sustaining city's port regulations).
100. This illustrates the problem of line-drawing here. If the state set maximum beer prices that
"are fair and equitable," the result again might be similar to that of Connecticut's scheme. But
the connection to market advantages in other states would be hidden. Unless a challenger could
show reliance on prices outside the state, this regulation ought to be sustained.
101. In practice, such a statute might have no effect because there is no price differential to
alter; this might result from deals among state regulators. Or its effect might be to cause some
beer manufacturers not to sell in Connecticut. The effect would be partly a function of the enacting
state's relative size. Regulations of New York and California have much more effect on smaller
states than vice versa, and their regulators have greater clout in making deals. A large state's price
regulation would probably succeed in capturing market advantages from its smaller neighbors, while
a small state's regulation would more likely cause a seller to withdraw from its market. Either
result is protectionism.
Because Connecticut is smaller than two of its three neighbors, its regulation would probably not
have been very successful in lowering local prices unless its regulators reached deals with those of
New York and Massachusetts. But the Court must apply the same rule to New York, Texas, and
California, where the effect would be to appropriate smaller state advantages.
102. Healy. 109 S. Ct. at 2501.
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duties, 0 1 invoking an analogy derived from independent discrimination.
Moreover, the Court's traditional theory for this kind of case-that
Connecticut was attempting to regulate transactions in other states-is
too crude. Many state laws have collateral effects on their neighbors,
and most of them are not suspect on that account alone. "The mere
fact that state action may have repercussions beyond state lines is of no
judicial significance so long as the action is not within the domain which
the Constitution forbids." 1 °
Connecticut's theory was that the actual brewers, all of them out-of-
state companies, were charging above-market prices in Connecticut, caus-
ing Connecticut residents near a border to buy out-of-state. Thus, the
state argued, the only effect of the statute would be to lower Connecticut
prices to the market prices already prevailing in border states, and those
prices would not change. This "market failure" idea was actually endorsed
by the Healy dissenters. 105
But this was tooth fairy economics. There was no evidence in the case
that the beer industry was monopolized or otherwise able to conspire
about prices. And even if it were, there was no conceivable reason why
that would lead to price discrimination defined by a state boundary. By
far the most likely reason for higher beer prices in Connecticut was
higher state-imposed costs. And the Court's opinion suggested an expla-
nation: Connecticut forbade price and volume discounts, specials, and
the like, while its neighbors allowed them. 1' Modern American retailers
operate in a world of more or less perpetual "discounts" and "sales,"
and a state that opts out of that system may cause its prices to rise in
relation to those members of the consuming public who pursue every
"discount." Thus, to the extent it was effective, the Connecticut law
would have foisted some of Connecticut's regulatory costs onto consumers
and retailers in other states.
Healy also raises a question about state liquor monopolies. In many
states, some kinds of alcoholic beverages are sold only by the state. And
the Supreme Court has held that commerce clause limits on state pro-
tectionism do not apply to the state as a market participant, that is,
states as buyers and sellers are free to discriminate against interstate
commerce. 07 Monopoly liquor states can claim that they can have the
kind of price fixing that Healy denied Connecticut because they are
market participants rather than regulators.
103. Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig Co., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935).
104. Healy, 109 S. Ct. at 2505 (Rehnquist. C. J., dissenting) (quoting Osborn v. Odin, 310 U.S.
53, 62 (1940)).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2500-01. Connecticut and Massachusetts also mandated sale in reusable containers on
which a deposit was paid, while New York and Rhode Island did not, and this may have added
to differential regulatory costs. See United States Brewers Ass'n v. Healy, 532 F. Supp. 1312, 1319
(D. Conn. 1982) (Healy 1). However, no party to either Healy I or Healy 11 attempted to show
any relevance of this scheme. If a recycling state regulated to deter consumer importation of throw-
away containers, the state would have an argument for validity under the Court's quarantine cases.
See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
107. E.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
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This situation can be distinguished from the Court's precedents. In
prior cases, the state was participating in a market from which it did
not exclude others, while liquor monopolies bar private sellers in the
state. In other words, a liquor monopoly involves the state as both market
participant and regulator. When the state is but one actor in a private
market, its parochial buying and selling amount to subsidies to local
interests, and the essence of the market participant rule is to exempt
protectionist subsidies from the dormant commerce power doctrine. Most
of the policy reasons that support the market participant exception are
confined to subsidies.° 8 But when a large state's liquor monopoly pegs
its purchase prices to those in another state, there is no subsidy, and
the regulatory cost is much more successfully exported onto outsiders
than in the case of subsidies.
On the other hand, an important reason for the market participant
exception is the difficulty of identifying when a state as buyer or seller
has favored local interests, and that difficulty is little different when a
state is a monopolist. Thus the Court is likely to decide that a state as
buyer is free to dicker for any price it chooses, and it can consider prices
charged elsewhere in deciding on its purchases. But if a monopoly state
imposes a formal rule that requires price equivalence with neighboring
states, the Court would likely strike it down.1°9
IV. JUSTICE SCALIA ON COMMON MARKET POLICY AND
ORIGINAL INTENT
Justice Scalia argued in Tyler that the entire dormant commerce power
doctrine is mistaken because it is contrary to the intent of the framers."10
He also opined that the doctrine lacked any coherent theory and had
been carried out poorly,"' and his Bendix opinion parodied the Court's
leading balancing test."12 His later opinions asserted that the doctrine
ought to be confined to facial discrimination against interstate com-
merce." ' Presumably, he continues to rely on his Tyler arguments as
reasons for the Court to confine review to facial discrimination, or as
I have suggested, to independent discrimination.
In any broad sense, it is hard to know what Justice Scalia means by
lack of coherent theory. Before our nation's independence, Europeans
had attempted primitive common market arrangements, and these efforts
were favorably mentioned by the framers." 4 Canada and Australia to
108. See Collins, supra note 74, at 98-105.
109. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (invalidating state
rule regulating resale of timber bought from the state).
110. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 263-64 (1987).
111. Id. at 259-65.
112. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 895-98 (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment).
113. See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
114. See The Federalist No. 42 p. 284 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (Switzerland, Germany,
the Netherlands).
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some extent copied our system, including judicial involvement; the three
nations have followed similar paths."15 The European Economic Com-
munity has adopted like methods of economic integration, again including
judicial supervision." 6 There is abundant literature about federal common
markets, theoretical and practical.' 7
Justice Scalia's claim that the Court has poorly carried out a common
market policy has force to the extent that it is based on some of the
Court's opinions. American constitutional and political arrangements dis-
tort articulation. In many legal fields, the Court's opinions exaggerate
its deference to states' rights, and dormant commerce clause cases are
no exception." ' Indeed, the Court's strained reliance on an expanded
concept of discrimination plausibly may be explained as an effort to
invoke an accepted ideological counterweight to states' rights. Moreover,
this is part time work for the Court; it is not surprising that its opinions
are less careful than those of the European Court of Justice. Nevertheless,
what the Court does is much better than what it says; its product compares
favorably with that of other systems."19
A. Policy Consequences of Justice Scalia's Position
Rather than extensively discuss broad policy issues, I shall comment
on whether Justice Scalia's reasons should lead the Court to confine the
dormant commerce power doctrine to independent discrimination. If the
Court did that, it would abandon three overlapping lines of precedent.
It would withdraw its broad limits on multiple taxation and regulation,
it would no longer strike down state regulatory laws that burden commerce
based on risk of conflict with laws of other states, and it would no
longer strike down laws that particularly burden commerce in transit
through the enacting state.
20
The most important consequence would be for commerce in transit
through states, the principal beneficiary of all the standards to be forgone.
115. See R. JOHNSTON, THE EFFECT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ON FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN AUS-
TRALIA, CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES ch. VI (1969); V. MACKINNON, COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM
(1964).
-116. See Schermers, The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Free Movement of Goods,
I CTS. & FREE MARKETS 222 (1980); WAgenbaur, Elimination of Discriminatory State Taxation in
Intra-Community Trade: The Contribution of the European Court of Justice, 2 CTS. & FREE
MARKETS 480 (1981).
117. See, e.g., INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE
(M. Capelletti et al. eds. 1986); COURTS AND FREE MARKETS (T. Sandalow & E. Stein eds. 1980);
R. JOHNSTON, supra note 115; V. MACKINNON, supra note 115; FEDERALISM AND THE CANADIAN
ECONOMIC UNION (M. Trebilcock, J. Prichard, T. Courchene & J. Whalley eds. 1983); AmERIcAN
ENTERPRISE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET: A LEGAL PROFILE (E. Stein & T. Nicholson eds.
1960); A. SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
118. See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978). The Court held invalid a
state law regulating truck size in an opinion that stated, "In no field has [the Court's] deference
to state regulations been greater than that of highway safety regulation." Id. at 443. Because the
Court is particularly concerned with conflict burdens on commerce in transit, this statement is
inaccurate. See infra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., R. JOHNSTON, supra note 115, ch. VII.
120. See supra notes 26-39 and accompanying text.
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State burdens on commerce in transit rarely discriminate independently;
burdens usually depend on actions of other states. Risk of regulatory
conflict is invoked mostly to strike down laws that burden interstate
transportation and communication passing through the enacting state.'21
The multiple burdens doctrine is not targeted solely at commerce in
transit, but it has important applications to interstate transportation and
communication. One of the Court's per se rules, which states seldom
challenge, bars any ad valorem taxation of goods in transit through a
state. "2
Withdrawing all judicial protection from commerce in transit would
be unfortunate. This is the most ancient and best established common
market problem. Commerce in transit has the least protection from local
politics because so few local interests benefit from it. An import or
export transaction involves a local party as buyer or seller, and these
commercial interests can often persuade legislatures to limit multiple
taxation or other burdens. But commerce in transit lacks political support
and will be made to pay much more than its way. One subtle form of
favoritism imposes transportation burdens but exempts some import and
export transactions from them.1
2
1
This analysis corresponds with a common sense view of legitimate state
interests. States have an obviously more weighty and worthy interest in
regulating and taxing their import and export commerce than they have
in imposing on goods passing through. From an economic point of view,
costs imposed on commerce in transit are much more successfully imposed
on persons outside the state than are costs imposed on import-export
commerce.
These problems are not so acute as they once were. Congress is less
inhibited about undertaking regulation and might fill a void left by the
Court.'2 4 And technology has reduced the ability of states to exploit their
geography. But it is hard to see the attraction of encouraging more
121. This does not mean that such laws exclusively burden commerce in transit; most laws that
burden commerce in transit also burden import-export and local commerce in some measure as
well. The Court's principal concern is with laws that substantially burden commerce in transit. See,
e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (striking down train length law that
principally burdened trains traversing the state). But see Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways, 450
U.S. 662 (1981), and Raymond Motor Transp. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978) (striking down laws
that made special exceptions for state import-export commerce),
122. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981); Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1 (1933).
See also Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, -, 109 S. Ct. 582, 589 (1989) (dictum) (states may
not tax telephone calls in transit). Cf. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868) (similar
holding regarding passengers, including those in transit, but not relying on commerce clause).
123. See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 676-77; Raymond Motor Transp., 434 U.S. at 446-47. As previously
noted, discrimination against commerce in transit and in favor of import-export commerce is a
form of independent discrimination, but states usually burden commerce in transit without any form
of independent discrimination. See supra note 26.
124. Congress is less inhibited legally as well as politically; former judicial limits on congressional
regulatory power have been withdrawn. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTONAL
LAW 148-59 (3d ed. 1986). In the tax field, Congress has in fact imposed its own limits. See, e.g.,
15 U.S.C. §§ 381-84, 391 (1982); 49 U.S.C. §§ 1513, 11503-11503a (1982).
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federal regulatory legislation, and technological changes are already rec-
ognized by the Court.'2
When the Court's multiple burdens doctrine is applied to purely import-
export commerce, the need for judicial supervision is considerably reduced.
The Court might reasonably conclude that local political restraint and
technological change are sufficient common market protections. From
this policy perspective, the Tyler decision, which involved only import-
export commerce, can be questioned despite its pedigree in precedent.
But the American Trucking decision heavily involved commerce in transit.'2
Despite its apparent clash with precedent, it had stronger backing in
common market policy.
Multiple taxation has another serious economic consequence that in-
volves other policy issues. Industry can avoid multiple sales and other
turnover taxes by vertical integration. The fewer times a good is bought
or sold from raw material to ultimate user, the fewer chances for turnover
taxes. Thus, multiple taxation is an inducement for vertical integration.
Whether this effect ought to bear on the dormant commerce power
doctrine is a complex question, but it is at least relevant to a full policy
debate on the Court's multiple burdens doctrine.
B. Original Intent
Justice Scalia's reliance on the framers is consistent with his other
opinions, where he invokes original intent more often than other justices
do.'17 However, the particular original intent claim in Tyler was supported
by a shallow and selective review of the issue. Part of the opinion
scorched the wooden version of the "exclusive commerce power" theory
attributed to Marshall's opinion and Webster's argument in Gibbons.28
Many a constitutional law teacher has had fun with that, but it is surely
125. See, e.g., Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, Tax Comm'r, 423 U.S. 276, 288 (1976).
126. This is the most important conclusion to be derived from the truckers' statistical showing
that locally-registered trucks paid the tax at only one-fifth the rate per mile of trucks registered
elsewhere. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. Local registration will strongly correlate with
trucks that either travel only within the state, or engage in the state's import-export commerce, as
opposed to trucks that merely pass through the state. Of course, the showing would have been
more directly pertinent if it had directly compared commerce in transit with other truck commerce.
127. In addition to Tyler, see Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2974 (1989); South Carolina
v. Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207, 2218 (1989) (Scalia. J., dissenting); City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, -, 109 S. Ct. 706. 737 (1989) (Scalia, I., concurring in the judgment);
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, -, 109 S. Ct. 647, 682-83 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 864 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman,
486 U.S. 717, 723 (1988); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 816-18 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment).
Justice Scalia discussed "Originalism versus Nonoriginalism" with students at the University of
Kentucky College of Law on September 15, 1988. He acknowledged problems with rigid positions
either way and advocated reliance on original intent as a moderating influence on judicial review.
128. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 261 (citing
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824)).
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a straw. That so subtle a mind as Marshall's meant the argument in its
mechanical form is most unlikely. 2 9
Justice Scalia's second straw was Justice Field's silly argument that
the dormant commerce power doctrine should be implied from congres-
sional silence.130 Scalia also abused the views of Chief Justice Taney and
Justice Frankfurter. He selectively cited Taney's opinion in The License
Cases,'3' without acknowledging that Taney qualified that view elsewhere
in the same opinion and in his later decisions.' 2 He quoted Frankfurter
the scholar, who indeed questioned the doctrine, but took no note of
Frankfurter the justice, who altered his views and became an ardent
defender of it.'3
It is reasonably clear that the framers in Philadelphia intended that
the commerce clause restrain interstate economic conflicts. 34 In Madison's
words, the interstate clause was "intended as a negative and preventive
provision against injustice among the States themselves."'' 3
129. Marshall's probable premise was that the power to impose regulations on more than one
state is exclusively federal, and he thought that concept might be developed into judicial protection
against interstate economic warfare. He surely foresaw many of the difficulties of working it out.
That much is implied by his retreat to the preemption holding in the case-a holding that is
nevertheless hard to understand absent a national common market policy. See Cohen, Congressional
Power to Define State Power to Regulate Commerce: Consent and Pre-emption. 2 CTs. & FREE
MARKETS 523, 538-45 (1982).
130. See Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 125 U.S. 465. 508 (1888) (Field, J., concurring);
Tyler, 483 U.S. at 262 (the "least plausible theoretical justification of all").
131. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 579 (1847).
132. Tyler, 483 U.S. at 261. At the passage cited, Taney was answering the exclusive commerce
power argument in absolute form, as he clearly said. His opinion suggested support for limits on
state power over goods in transit, The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 575-76, and for limits
on extraterritorial effects of state laws, id. at 585. For a discussion of Taney's later decisions, see
Collins, supra note 74, at 49-50.
133. See Tyler, 483 U.S. at 264 (citing F. FRANxFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSt.L,
TANEY AND WAr (1937)); Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542, 548 (1950) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting); Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.) (striking down state tax
on interstate sales).
134. See 2 M. FAR.ArD, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 308 (1937) (Sherman); id. at
54748 (Madison's Preface to Debates in the Convention); THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 39-41 (A.
Hamilton); No. 11, at 71-72 (A. Hamilton); No. 22, at 137 (A. Hamilton); No. 42, at 283-84 (J.
Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
Justice Miller was the principal architect of the dormant commerce power doctrine during the
post-Civil War period, and his opinions relied on original intent. See Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97
U.S. 566, 574 (1878); Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123, 134-36 (1869).
135. Letter from James Madison to J. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), reprinted in 4 LETTRmS AND OTHER
WRITINGS OF JAIKES MADISON at 14-15 (J. B. Lippincott & Co., Philadelphia 1865). See also Letter
from James Madison to Professor Davis, reprinted in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 251-54, stating that "it could not be the intention of those who framed the Constitution
to substitute for a power in Congress to impose a protective tariff, a power merely to permit the
states individually to do it." Id. at 251 (emphasis in original).
In Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary Comment,
25 Mrn. L. REv. 432 (1941), Professor Abel extensively reviewed the original history of the
commerce clause and concluded that the history as a whole corresponded with Madison's quoted
views. Id. at 480-81. Justice Scalia cited Abel in his opinion but failed to acknowledge his conclusion.
Tyler, 483 U.S. at 261. Abel's work appeared during the post-1937 debate about the scope of
Congress's affirmative power to regulate interstate commerce. His chief point was that the original
history contemplated a small scope for the latter power, as Madison had said. For a satire on the
debate about original intent of Congress's interstate power, see Bittker, The Bicentennial of the
Jurisprudence of Original Intent: The Recent Past, 77 CAuI. L. REv. 235, 240-43 (1989).
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There are considerable leaps from this evidence to the Court's dormant
commerce power doctrine. One way the connection might be severed is
by the argument that the evidence of intent is confined to Philadelphia
insiders, especially Madison; 36 there is almost no evidence from the
ratification reports. This proposition has its best application to settle
conflicts between popular understanding and insider deals. But there is
no evidence of a popular understanding in 1787 and 1788 that the
Constitution would leave the states free to exploit their neighbors with
tariffs and taxes on commerce in transit, nor of an insider deal.
A second problem in connecting original intent to the dormant com-
merce power doctrine is lack of any evidence that the framers contemplated
judicial enforcement. On the original record, enforcement by Congress
alone would have been at least as plausible. But there is again no evidence
the other way; we simply do not know how the framers thought the
commerce clause "negative ... against injustice among the States" would
be enforced. Legislative enforcement would have been more familiar to
them, but this is not conclusive against the courts. The issue is wrapped
up in the general controversy over the proper role of the federal judiciary.
If there is to be a dormant commerce power doctrine, there are many
issues about its scope, and it is here that Justice Scalia has staked his
concrete challenge to the Court's doctrine. However, from the standpoint
of original intent, Justice Scalia's formulation has the emphasis backward.
Facial or independent discrimination mostly addresses states' burdens
imposed on their imports and exports, like the paradigms of tariffs,
quotas, and embargoes. Yet the original sources show that the framers'
main concern was with taxation of commerce in transit; there was very
little discussion of burdens on imports or exports of the enacting state. 3 ,
Thus Scalia's position would have the Court recede from addressing the
problem that was foremost in the framers' minds. This is a good lesson
in the slipperiness of any rigid theory of original intent jurisprudence.
V. CONCLUSION
In American Trucking, the Supreme Court relied on a broad concept
of forbidden discrimination against interstate commerce that had evolved
accidentally in Armco and Tyler. All were tax cases. In cases about
136. Justice Scalia has opposed use of legislative history for interpreting statutes. See Sable Comm.
of Calif., Inc. v. F.C.C., 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2840 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Jett v. Dallas Indep.
School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702, 2724 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 109 S. Ct. 1981, 1994 (1989) (Scalia, J.. concurring
in the judgment); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, -, 109 S. Ct. 939, 946-47 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 344
(Scalia, J., concurring in part). Cf. United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, -, 109 S. Ct. 1183,
1193 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (similar opinion regarding treaties). However.
this derives from reaction to modern evidence that some legislative history is manipulated and from
his strong views about separation of powers. Scalia imposes no like standard on legislative history
of the Constitution. he frequently cites Madison in his original intent opinions.
137. See supra note 134. Virtually all of the specific examples in the sources cited concerned
commerce in transit. The same is true of sources discussed in Abel, supra note 135.
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regulatory laws, the Court has consistently limited the concept to dis-
crimination without reference to the laws of other states, what I have
called independent discrimination. In tax case opinions, the Court had
strayed to a broader meaning only occasionally. The broader definition
includes state laws that burden interstate commerce only in conjunction
with the laws of other states, what I have called dependent discrimination.
In regulation cases, the Court has also recognized that independent
discrimination coincides with protectionism and has made it presumptively
invalid. If the same presumption is mindlessly extended to dependent
discrimination, many more state laws will fall.
Even if the Court does not intend to extend the definition, the broader
definition will confuse state officials, taxpayers, and the lower courts.
The confusion is compounded by the appearance in the same opinions
of the internal consistency test. This test evaluates whether a state tax
law is facially designed to avoid the risk of multiple taxation of interstate
commerce. That apportionment or allocation ought to be required by
the commerce clause is a necessary predicate to the test's application.
Determining this predicate is submerged under the rhetorical force of the
discrimination idea. Decisions since American Trucking have not borne
out the portent; the Bendix decision deliberately adhered to the traditional
definition of independent discrimination in cases about regulatory laws.
But uncertainty has not been allayed.
In Healy, the Court again applied the concept of discrimination to a
category of cases not previously identified with the concept. But this
time, the extension was reasonably consistent with traditional doctrine
because the -state statute at issue did discriminate independently of the
laws of other states.
Justice Scalia analyzed some of these points better than other members
of the Court, deciding that Healy involved discrimination, while Tyler
and American Trucking did not. But his illumination of the discrimination
issue was marred by entanglement with his attacks on the Court's multiple
burden doctrine. His opinion featured a poorly reasoned original intent
claim, and it failed to acknowledge that the great weight of precedent
was against his position. While there is a principled way to achieve part
of what he wishes, his attack was too crudely formulated to find it.
And his Bendix opinion described a multiple burden case as discrimination
when the Court did not.
The Court as a whole continues to have a good intuitive sense of what
it is doing in dormant commerce power cases, but a much less com-
mendable ability to explain itself. When combined with disagreements
among the justices, this is a recipe for confusion. The doctrine would
become clearer if the Court distinguished the concept of independent
discrimination from multiple and conflict burdens that depend on en-
actments by two or more states and differentiated between laws that
impose only on a state's import or export commerce and those that also
burden commerce in transit through the state.
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